EXHIBIT B

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     UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
      SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK
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     THE INTERCEPT MEDIA, INC.,
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                     Plaintiff,
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                                              24 Civ. 1515 (JSR)
                 V.
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     OPEN AI, INC., MICROSOFT, et
      al.,
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                                              Oral Argument
                    Defendants.
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                                              New York, N.Y.
10
                                              June 3, 2024
                                              10:10 a.m.
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     Before:
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                            HON. JED S. RAKOFF,
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                                              District Judge
14
                                APPEARANCES
15
     LOEVY & LOEVY
          Attorneys for Plaintiff
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          MATTHEW TOPIC
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          CHRISTOPHER CARIELLO
          LISA T. SIMPSON
25
      Also Present:
      David Bralow
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(Case called)

MR. MATCH: Good morning. Stephen Match for The Intercept. With me I have Matt Topic, and David Bralow, general counsel of The Intercept.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MR. GRATZ: Good morning, your Honor. Joe Gratz for Morrison Foerster for OpenAI. With me are Eric Nikolaides from Morrison Foerster, and Alli Stillman and Yijun Zhong from the Latham Firm.

THE COURT: Good morning.

MS. HURST: Good morning, your Honor. Annette Hurst from Orrick, Herrington & Sutcliffe for Microsoft. And with me this morning are my colleagues Lisa Simpson and Chris Cariello.

THE COURT: Good morning. Were here on the motion to dismiss. Let me hear first from moving counsel.

MR. GRATZ: Thank you, your Honor.

Your Honor, the plaintiffs here are apparently not able to get ChatGPT to output their material. And you would think that would make them happy. It certainly makes us happy. That's not what ChatGPT is for, but it causes a problem for their claim because it means they have not been injured in a concrete way.

THE COURT: Let's take a hypothetical. So supposing you're a reporter for a Chicago newspaper called the *Chicago Examiner*. Your name is Hildy Johnson. And you're all too

young to know what I'm talking about.

MR. GRATZ: The Front Page, your Honor?

THE COURT: You got it. And you run an exclusive interview with accused murderer Earl Williams.

MR. GRATZ: Indeed.

THE COURT: Fully copyright. And now fast forward to the present, and it's picked up, along with a million other things, by ChatGPT. And then you are a consumer and you go on and you say, what would Earl Williams have to say if he were asked to give his own account of why he committed the alleged murder. And out pops word for word the story that we've just referred to, but without any copyright information, any indication it came from the Chicago Examiner, etc.

If that were to occur, would you agree that would be a violation?

MR. GRATZ: So, your Honor, I want to add, I want to add a fact to your hypothetical, which is the material that popped out is copyright expression, copyrighted by the newspaper. Right?

THE COURT: Right.

MR. GRATZ: And I think in that case that might well be a problem. I think that might well be a problem for under a number of theories. It might be a copyright infringement problem, to which there might be a fair use question attached. There might be a number of issues. But there might be, if

there were all the elements there, if there were reason to believe that that infringement was concealed beforehand, that might well be a 1202 problem if you have the identical thing coming out without -- and the only difference was it didn't have the CMI attached.

THE COURT: So your point, as I take it, is that they haven't even come close to something like that, whereas, theoretically, they could have inputted something into your chat, and if out came their stories, they would have a claim.

MR. GRATZ: Or at least they would be much closer to having a claim, your Honor, yes.

THE COURT: Okay. So I know we want to go in order here, but let me ask you to sit down for a minute, and we'll come back to you very shortly.

MR. GRATZ: Thank you, your Honor.

THE COURT: But let me ask plaintiff's counsel, why isn't that the problem?

MR. MATCH: Good morning, your Honor. It's not a problem because 1202(b)(1) and 1202(b)(3) don't require there to be an actual infringement or an actual concealment of an infringement. If we're talking about what we need to say to state a claim as opposed to standing, which is where I think Mr. Gratz was starting here, 1202(b)(1) requires that there be a possible concealment of infringement in the future. And we --

THE COURT: How do you know for starters, because I'm 1 2 not sure I saw it in your complaint other than in conclusory 3 fashion, that they even copied your stuff? 4 MR. MATCH: So we've alleged that there are recreated 5 approximations of their training sets and that those training 6 sets contain --7 THE COURT: Recreated proximations? 8 MR. MATCH: Approximations, yes. 9 THE COURT: What the heck are they? 10 MR. MATCH: I have to go outside the complaint to 11 describe this, but they are --12 THE COURT: Well --13 MR. MATCH: If you want me to stay within -- we 14 haven't described them in detail in the complaint. 15 THE COURT: So what am I to make of something you 16 haven't specified? 17 MR. MATCH: I think we've alleged plausibly that there 18 are these approximations created by third parties of their training sets that contain our articles in them. 19 20 THE COURT: You may have alleged that, but if you 21 haven't alleged that -- where do you allege that the 22 approximate ones show that your stuff was copied? 23 I'm sorry, that our stuff is copyrighted? MR. MATCH: 24 THE COURT: No. It has been --25 MR. MATCH: Copied.

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1 THE COURT: -- copied by them. 2 That would be paragraph 38. MR. MATCH: 3 THE COURT: Hold on a minute. Paragraph 38. 4 "Various sources," p.s. unnamed, "have recreated 5 approximations of the Common Crawl and WebText training sets 6 based on publicly available information discussing the 7 methodologies used to create them. Those sources have made these recreated data sets, or instructions on how to derive 8 9 them, available on the internet. Thousands of plaintiff's 10 works are contained in the recreated versions of these data 11 sets without the author, title, copyright notice, and terms of 12 use infringement found in plaintiff's original publications." 13 So if I were to give you leave to amend, what would 14 you add to that paragraph? 15 MR. MATCH: So if you were to give us leave to amend, we would explain with more detail about what these 16 17 approximations were and how they were derived. If you want I 18 can say it now without --19 THE COURT: Absolutely. 20 MR. MATCH: Sure. There are a couple of different 21 There's one called C4. C4 is a training set that was 22 used for Google's own AI model, another large language model, 23 kind of like ChatGPT. It was created from the same overall

corpus that some of OpenAI's training sets were created from.

That's called Common Crawl, which we've identified in this

paragraph.

And we do allege this in the complaint that we employed a data scientist to analyze the C4 data set. And the C4 data set contains 2,753 Intercept articles. And he was able to write a script that has identified for each article exactly what type of copyright management information was removed from it. And in --

THE COURT: So let me stop you there.

MR. MATCH: Yes.

THE COURT: So assuming for the sake of argument that that's what was done by the defendants here, the equivalent of what you've just described. Are you saying that their mere input of those into their database is a violation, or do you contend that the result was that the output would be a violation?

MR. MATCH: So, both. So the copying into the database, sort of the initial copying into the database, if it could be like an infringement of copyright under Section 106, we haven't brought an infringement claim here because our works aren't registered with the Copyright Office. That's not required for a 1202 claim, which is the claim we're bringing here. So the copying of the articles and the removal of the copyright management information is a violation of 1202(b)(1).

THE COURT: Why is your stuff not copyright?

MR. MATCH: Well, we own copyright to it.

THE COURT: I understand that. But I mean why is it not registered?

MR. MATCH: It hasn't been registered because unlike for print publications, there's no sort of — it's economically just very expensive to register copyrights in online only publications because there's no ability to bulk register them. So that's why, I mean, I think very few, if any, online only establishers have registered their online news articles with a Copyright Office. Unlike, you know, more legacy media that also has a print version that can bulk register their works. So that's why it's not registered.

THE COURT: So I cut you off sort of midstream. You were saying it's both the violation under both the input and the output, and what about the output aspect?

MR. MATCH: So, the output, if our works are conveyed to the public, without copyright management information, that would be a violation.

THE COURT: Yes. But supposing like it's a paragraph here or a paragraph there, still a violation?

MR. MATCH: Well, I mean there's -- this isn't an issue that really has been briefed in a lot of detail. There has been cases holding that excerpts produced without CMI can constitute a violation. Now, I recognize that there has to be a somewhat close to an identical match between the original article and the copied version without CMI under (b)(3). But

know, knowledge that an infringement will be concealed, which relates to the removal claim as well, that doesn't have to be an identical copy because infringement itself doesn't require anything like an identical reproduction. It could be a large amount of text. I mean, there you have to get into fair use. But for the scienter element, concealment of an infringement, that doesn't have to be an identical copy.

THE COURT: So what stopped you from just putting questions into the defendant's product and seeing if what came out was your stuff?

MR. MATCH: So, this is not the first of these cases that's been filed against the defendants. In the New York

Times case, they had regurgitations of their works. They put them in the complaint, and they were accused by OpenAI of hacking their products.

So we don't believe that we had to do that in this case, both for purposes of (b)(1) -- I'm sorry, 12(b)(6) motion and purposes of standing. If the Court concludes that that's required, I would request permission to replead those facts and try to do that. But we haven't done that because of the accusations that OpenAI made against New York Times in its case.

THE COURT: Okay. Let's go back to defense counsel. We'll come back to plaintiff's counsel in a minute.

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is -- no, it's it.

1 So, first of all, anything you wanted to say just in 2 response to what was just said by plaintiff's counsel? 3 MR. GRATZ: Only, your Honor, that we heard a lot of "if" and a lot of "it's possible." And the CoreLogic case from 4 5 Judge Berzon addresses how you think about those issues in the 6 context of this statute in way that I think sort of resolves 7 why this complaint doesn't. 8 THE COURT: So am I right that your training sets are 9 kept secret? MR. GRATZ: That is correct. We do not make all of 10 11 our training sets public. 12 THE COURT: And so how is any plaintiff who believes 13 you have violated the relevant statutes going to be able to 14 plead, if other than by using say analogous training sets or other expert material or whatever, as they allege they've done 15 16 here? 17 MR. GRATZ: The answer is if it never comes out, none of them have a claim. And they can see whether or not it comes 18 19 out. 20 THE COURT: And they can see by putting in their 21 own --22 MR. GRATZ: They can, they can --23 THE COURT: So why shouldn't I give him, give the 24 plaintiffs -- plaintiff, who I quess is her. Right? Plaintiff

MR. GRATZ: It.

THE COURT: Or these days we would say they. Why shouldn't I give the plaintiff an opportunity to replead to see if they can do that?

MR. GRATZ: Well, I think the first thing I would say is they've made no proffer that they would be able to. What they've said is well, you know -- and they have not told us whether or not they tried and were unable to.

What they have said is, well, *The Times* did what they did and you said what they did broke the rules and was inappropriate, and so we didn't try and do anything. They should have tried to sweet talk ChatGPT into doing something it wasn't designed to do to see whether they had a claim here. We don't think they're going to be able to and they've made no proffer that they're able to. And, you know, we have -- you can get to this from your phone. This isn't a hidden or difficult thing.

And so I think the answer is they haven't made a proffer of what would happen if they got leave to do that. And I think, in fact, they just haven't been -- we heard they have a data scientist. They haven't been able to do it.

THE COURT: So I come back, since your argument in substantial part is they haven't done that, they therefore, haven't alleged any actual injury, therefore they both lack standing and can't make a claim. And given the thrust of the

federal rules for free leave to amend, why shouldn't I give them say two weeks to give it a shot?

MR. GRATZ: We think that is within your power. We don't think they've made a proffer that like necessarily justifies it, but we recognize it's within your Honor's power to do so, and we can be back here arguing about whatever other issues arise out of whatever they find or don't find.

THE COURT: And think how much more you could bill your clients. We'll disregard that.

Let's go back to plaintiff's counsel. Assuming for the sake of argument I give you two weeks to amend in the fashion I've just indicated and you've tried, fail. You can't get anything that's remotely your stories out of the stuff, is that the end of your lawsuit?

MR. MATCH: No. And I want to take that both from the perspective of standing and from the perspective of the elements of the claim. So on standing, the issue is really whether we've alleged a concrete injury and whether dissemination of our works is required for that.

The *TransUnion* framework is the applicable framework here, which requires us to identify a historical analogue to our injury. I think we don't need to identify an exact duplicate. And I think the Second Circuit's decision in *Saba Cap. v. Nuveen* provides a helpful starting point for how close that analogy has to be. It found sufficiently analogous an

analogy between trespass to channels and interference with voting rights in an investment fund, solely because they both involved something analogous to a property-based injury. And that's essentially what we're identifying as the relevant injury for purposes of standing, which is a property-based injury analogous to copyright infringement.

So infringements don't require dissemination. We briefed this, and they haven't disputed it. So if copyright infringement is the relevant analogy, then I think we've satisfied the concreteness requirement even if we haven't identified any dissemination. Why is it a close analogy? It's a close analogy because I think in typical cases, violations of --

THE COURT: How are you injured, assuming your premise, which is that they're copying, period, regardless of whether they then disseminated is a violation; how are you injured by that fact?

MR. MATCH: The injury is the interference with our property. And that has been recognized as an injury since --

THE COURT: Well, I know those cases in the copyright context. What's your damages?

MR. MATCH: So in this case we're seeking statutory damages primarily, which is provided by the DMCA. It's also provided by the Copyright Act, which Congress did because it recognized that actual damages can be very difficult to prove

in these sorts of cases. So that's primarily what we're seeking here.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me go back. I'm sorry to go back and forth.

MR. MATCH: No problem.

THE COURT: It's more helpful for me to do it this way.

MR. GRATZ: And, your Honor, Ms. Hurst will address this line.

THE COURT: Okay. Very good. Thank you.

So supposing, hypothetically, an unquestionably copyrighted work is fed into your database but never disseminated, why isn't that nevertheless a violation?

MS. HURST: Your Honor, it's clear that the attribution right is not part of the historical tradition of copyright in the United States. And we can see this, your Honor, because the right of attribution did not come into the Copyright Act until the 1990 enactment of Section 106A in the Visual Artists Rights Act.

And for all the years prior to that, your Honor, not only was the right of attribution not part of the U.S.

Copyright Act, but the U.S. had refused on a number of occasions to exceed to The Berne Convention and the provisions that included the right of attribution and the right of integrity.

Your Honor, the Second Circuit describes the fact that moral rights, droit moral from the French tradition, are not part of the Copyright Act in the *Gilliam* case. And there's also an extensive tracing of this history in a report issued by the Copyright Office in 2016, your Honor. And let me just give the Court --

THE COURT: 2016, oh, yeah, just shortly before my birth.

MS. HURST: Apologies, your Honor. It's 2019 actually, your Honor, and that report is available on the Copyright Office website. It's a report from the register Karyn Temple entitled Authors, Attribution, and Integrity: Examining Moral Rights in the United States.

And, your Honor, it's really clear that the right of attribution, which is what CMI protects, just isn't part of the historical tradition of protection of economic rights for copyright. And indeed, it really excludes the possibility of treating that as closely analogous to a copyright interest because it has never been so. And even now, your Honor, there's only a very limited right of attribution in Section 106A.

So the CMI protects this attribution, a voluntary attribution that people can apply by putting CMI on it, but it is that interest in personality or the right to be associated with the work that is protected. And that is what has to be

harmed here, your Honor, in order for them to have a sufficiently concrete injury under 12(b)(1).

Without dissemination, your Honor, that interest in personality simply cannot be harmed in the way that is required by *TransUnion*. And those were really the facts in *TransUnion*, your Honor, where the Court made a distinction between those in the class who had been able to show dissemination, and those in the class who had not.

So, your Honor, because moral rights are not part of the U.S. copyright tradition, the right of attribution is limited to dissemination. Without outputs, your Honor, they cannot plead the harm that is required to meet the 12(b)(1) standard. And, your Honor, I would just note that the words "harm" or "injury" do not appear anywhere in this complaint. There is presently no theory of harm in this complaint.

THE COURT: What do you say to the argument that Congress in this area has traditionally recognized that copying is itself a harm and that's why they put in statutory damages because often you can't prove any other harm?

MS. HURST: That is correct, your Honor. And the answer to that is to bring a claim under the Copyright Act with the intended restrictions and limitations on that claim, the Section 1202 claim was not meant to supplant those restrictions and limitations. And indeed, the scheme there requires injury as a statutory matter in Section 1203 that is not part of

Section 501, in the main part of the Copyright Act, your Honor.

So there's a clear distinction and congress recognized that limitation as part of the DMCA, whereas it has not previously recognized that limitation as part of Section 501 or Section 504.

THE COURT: Okay. Let me hear from plaintiffs on this issue.

MR. MATCH: So the DMCA is not fundamentally about attribution. The strategy that Ms. Hurst is employing here is to suggest that the appropriate analogy that the Court needs to consider here is between the DMCA on the one hand and a nonexistent attribution right on the other. According to TransUnion, though, the question is whether the plaintiff has identified a close historical analogue.

So there was a question about whether we get to pick our analogy. We do under *TransUnion*. Of course the Court has to decide whether it's close enough. But I just want to point out why attribution is not a particularly close analogy here. There's a number of reasons.

Let's start with the report that Ms. Hurst mentioned from the Copyright Office. I agree that that report says that attribution is not part of the sort of tradition of copyright in this country. That report though -- I mean as she pointed out, Section 106A, the Visual Artists Rights Act, expressly mentions attribution in the text.

The DMCA says nothing about attribution. You would think that if the DMCA were about attribution, it would require attribution. But it doesn't. The DMCA does not require anybody to put any CMI on any work. It allows you, if you want to put CMI in the work, you can do that, but you don't have to put the author on. You can give plenty of information that qualifies as copyright management information that is not attributed, such as the title of the work, that doesn't attribute the work to anybody.

The page 98 of the report that Ms. Hurst mentioned, contains a recommendation from the Copyright Office that Congress amend Section 1202 to add a new section that would be identical to the present version of the statute. Except that it replaces the current scienter element with one that says, you know, with knowledge that the work wouldn't be attributed.

And attribution, I think if that were really the point of the DMCA would -- it's hard to see how Section 1202(b)(1) would even further that purpose at all given that we have Section 1202(b)(3), which requires distribution. (b)(1) doesn't. It can be satisfied by removal.

So the point is the defendants want the Court to sort of ask whether attribution is the right analogy and find that it's not satisfied because there's no dissemination. But the point is copyright infringement is a close analogy and it doesn't require dissemination. I would like to point out that

infringement will often be the way by which someone violates 1202(b)(1) and 1202(b)(3). So one way to violate (b)(1) is by creating a copy of a work that has CMI on it, making a copy of the work, and not including CMI on the copy. A citation for that is Associated Press v. All Headline News Corp, which we cite in our brief.

So that will violate (b)(1) assuming the scienter elements are met. But it will also violate at least prima facie the exclusive right to reproduction under Section 106. Ditto for (b)(3). (b)(3) requires distribution of a copyright protected work, which is also one of the exclusive rights under Section 106. In fact, I think the (b)(3) claim, which we haven't discussed a lot today, even satisfies their theory of standing at least as requiring dissemination, because by definition a distribution is a dissemination of the work.

So the point I want to drive home is that copyright infringement is a close analogy that DMCA, they both involve tampering with copyright protected works. Even on a (b)(1) claim, even if it's not done by actual copyright infringement, it's at least close to it because you're taking off information that's conveyed very close to the work. In the case of a news article, maybe you're removing the headline, which is what we alleged. The headline, although it's not copyrighted, it conveys meaning that is central to the meaning of the actual work. I think common experience shows that when you read a

news article, you're sort of colored by the headlines. So that's analogous to copyright infringement. It doesn't have to be infringement. *TransUnion* was very clear that it doesn't have to be exact duplicate. It's close and that's what we need to allege standing.

THE COURT: All right.

MR. MATCH: Sorry.

THE COURT: No, you can sit down. The parties have addressed all of the questions that I had. But let me give each side an opportunity to add anything else they wanted to add before we conclude the argument.

MS. HURST: Your Honor, briefly, I would just add on behalf of Microsoft that this whole discussion is even more theoretical because there's no theory in this complaint of how there could be any infringement resulting from any act allegedly taken by Microsoft. And that's important because even for 1202(b)(1), it's not just removal in the abstract, your Honor. It's removal with the ultimate aim of facilitating some infringement. And putting aside the propriety of analyzing scienter on a Rule 12(b) motion, your Honor, first let's just go to the objective thing that is required, which is some theory of infringement. And then there are these layers of scienter around that, your Honor. But the Court doesn't even have to look at those layers of scienter and whether the allegations are sufficient, because there's no theory of

ultimate infringement identified that is furthered by the alleged acts. And for OpenAI's ChatGPT product, there's no causation related — between the removal of CMI for either OpenAI or Microsoft, and any theory of infringement here, your Honor.

So while we're skeptical that any amendment can cure all of these problems, I did want to underscore, your Honor, the degree of remoteness that is really presented here by the allegations against Microsoft.

THE COURT: Thank you.

Anything further from plaintiff's counsel?

MR. MATCH: Yes, your Honor. I would just like to touch on this issue as well. Our allegations of infringement or infringement theory are contained in paragraphs 47 to 50. And there's really a couple of different types of infringement. So, first of all, it's not just inducing, enabling, or facilitating infringement, which is one type of infringement — or scienter.

There's also the concealment. So our theory, one of our theories of infringement, is that they infringe by two things. One is copying the articles in the first place and the second is regurgitation. So they know that removing CMI, I think, would conceal from ChatGPT users that they infringed copyright by both copying and regurgitation.

Now, of course we don't allege actual dissemination of

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our works, but it's important to keep in mind and I think the Court touched on this, we can try to do that if the Court believes that that's required, but we don't need to actually allege actual dissemination of our articles because concealment only has to be likely from an ex ante perspective when they remove the CMI. And we've alleged that it's likely here for a couple of reasons.

One is we've alleged the prevalence of our works in their training sets, there's thousands of them. One thing I forgot to mention before is that if the Court is wondering about how many articles are there, we put it in our brief.

OpenAI has admitted that in earlier versions of the training set contains exactly 6,484 of our articles. So there is no dispute, no reasonable dispute at least at the pleading stage if we were to amend that our articles are in there. They've admitted it.

The other is that according to a study that we cited in the complaint, 45 percent of the ChatGPT responses contains material identical to preexisting texts. So ChatGPT is a serial plagiarizer and it has a lot of our works to plagiarize. And I think those two facts put together make it likely that ex ante that our works would be regurgitated in whole or in part, and that would conceal from ChatGPT users —

THE COURT: Well, I will put the question that your adversary in effect invited me to put. Have you tried yourself

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1 in preparation for this lawsuit to see if that's true? 2 MR. MATCH: No. Like I said, we didn't do that 3 deliberately because -- yeah. 4 THE COURT: Whether it was deliberate or not. 5 MR. MATCH: Sure. We didn't do it. 6 THE COURT: I just wanted to know whether you did it 7 or not. 8 MR. MATCH: No. So, or at least I don't believe we And the other type of -- I'm sorry. I'm lost here. 9 10 THE COURT: No, no. How old are you? 11 MR. MATCH: Thirty-four. 12 THE COURT: You don't lose your memory until you're my 13 age. Now come on. Go ahead. 14 MR. MATCH: Actually, I should say I don't think that 15 we attempted to do that. There may have been like one or two very small prompts that we did at a very early stage that we 16 17 didn't decide to pursue. I honestly don't fully remember. 18 there were certainly no -- our data scientist who's the expert 19 never tried to do that. 20 THE COURT: Okay, well. 21 MR. MATCH: But I also wanted to point out that 22 defendants -- there's a second theory of infringement, which is 23 infringement by users. So if it's a likely ex ante that our 24 works would be requrgitated, whether or not they actually have

been, then they have reason to know that ChatGPT users would

further disseminate those works, and that's because the defendants promote ChatGPT as a -- I'm sorry, as a tool to generate content for a future audience.

And I think it's at least plausible that the existence of CMI on a regurgitation, which wouldn't be there because the CMI is removed from the training data, would at least be a deterrent to future copying by ChatGPT users.

I think all the Court needs to assume for those purposes is that users respect the law, either because they have some inherent regard for it or because they don't want to be liable for copyright infringement. That's all that I think the Court needs to assume to find that theory of infringement at least plausible enough. I would stress in discovery that they have the prompts, I assume, in their databases, at least for some users, and so that can be explored through discovery.

THE COURT: All right. I can see that defense counsel is itching to say some final words, but he has the burden of proof, so I will hear from defense counsel. I admire your restraint in only indicating by your body language that you wanted to be heard as opposed to standing up and saying I want to be heard.

MR. GRATZ: Thank you, your Honor. I will be extremely brief.

We heard that this might have happened to someone else and that is not particularized harm. That is exactly what the

situation in *TransUnion*. If someone else's content were outputted, that does not create a harm and does not show a likelihood of harm for the plaintiff.

The other thing that we heard that I want to just respond to briefly is that their theory on the second scienter element is that we should have known that this would conceal infringement. And the question is just conceal what, from whom, resulting in what harm to them? Right?

THE COURT: You're saying it involves many speculative steps?

MR. GRATZ: And the biggest speculative step in the middle is that their stuff comes out of ChatGPT. The issue we have been talking about, and I think now we heard, well, they tried a little, and it wasn't going well and --

THE COURT: I don't know we heard that. His memory was uncertain on that.

MR. GRATZ: Yeah. Well, we may well find out.

THE COURT: All right. Although you are hoping you won't because you're hoping you'll win the motion.

MR. GRATZ: Indeed, your Honor. We hope not to find out.

THE COURT: All right. Well, I thank all counsel for their excellent arguments.

As I'm sure you're all aware, a requirement for being a federal judge is that you be technologically incompetent, and

I am fully qualified. So it will take me a little while to get through this. But I will certainly get you a bottom line order at least by two weeks from now. Whether it will be a full opinion, it might just be an order with leave to amend, under many possibilities. I don't know. But at least you'll know where things stand two weeks from today.

So, again, my thanks. This concludes the proceeding. (Adjourned)